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Introduction 
Japan is one of the most rapidly ageing and 
depopulating countries in the world. Govern-
ment projections indicate that Japan may 
shrink 32 per cent from the high of 128 million 
in 2008 to approximately 87 million by 2060, 
due to a sustained fall in rates of human re-
production. Whereas in 1947 each woman 
expected to give birth in her lifetime to 4.54 
children, this had dropped below the popula-
tion replacement rate of 2.1 children per 
woman by 1974, and remained at below re-
placement to stand at 1.39 children in 2010 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Actual (1960-2010) and Projected 
(2020+) Population of Japan (left hand scale, 
millions) and by Age Group (right hand scale, 
%). (Source: Japanese government websites). 
 
 
 
 Overall, population reduction is proba-
bly good news for Japan, and possibly other 
countries too, in that it provides opportunities 
for reconfiguring living conditions and it may 
help to reduce human pressures on the natu-
ral environment. Nevertheless, ageing and 
depopulation bring with them consequences 
for affected regions, and policies may need to 
be developed to deal with these. What is in-
teresting about Japan’s situation as a pioneer 
shrinking society is how the outcomes of the-
se processes and policies might inform us 
about the prospects for other East and South-
east Asian countries such as China, South 
Korea, and Thailand in the years and decades 
to come, as they too experience similar devel-
opmental pathways. 
In this briefing paper I will outline the 
ways in which Japan’s demography has been 
changing and make comparisons with China 
and South Korea. I will then describe some of 
the impacts in Japan’s non-metropolitan re-
gions, focusing on the issue of over-capacity. I 
will conclude by looking to the future. 
 
Japan’s Changing Age-Structure 
Japan is in the midst of a dramatic century-
long shift in the age structure of the popula-
tion, from being a young country in 1960 to an 
old one in 2060 (Figure 1). Demographers 
have come to call these circumstances either 
a ‘demographic dividend’, due to the potential 
for a young population to deliver rapid eco-
nomic expansion, or a ‘demographic burden’, 
because of the high economic costs of main-
taining a hyper-aged society. Japan, moreo-
ver, is in a particularly difficult position, given 
that national debt in 2013 stands at approxi-
mately 240 per cent of GDP, with debt servic-
ing swallowing around a quarter of the nation-
al budget, and an annual budget deficit of 
around 6 per cent. 
When we compare demographic 
change in Japan with that of other countries in 
Asia such as China and South Korea, UN 
Population Division data, which are more con-
servative than the Japanese government’s, 
show Japan growing by 82 per cent in the 75 
year period up to its population peak in 2010, 
and project a 26 per cent shrinkage by 2085. 
The UN forecasts similar paths through for 
South Korea and China. South Korea is pro-
jected to grow and shrink 138 per cent and 26 
per cent in the 75 and 70 year period either 
side of its expected peak in 2030, and China 
by 154 per cent and 33 per cent in the 75 year 
periods either side of its peak in around 2025. 
In all three countries projections for the 
dependency ratio between working and non-
working people point to worrying consequenc-
es for the long-term stability of each nation’s 
finances, for the continuation of growth-
oriented economic regimes, and for maintain-
ing community stability and resilience. In Ja-
pan the dependency ratio reached its most 
economically advantageous position in 1990, 
just as the economy tilted into the long stag-
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nation known as the ‘Lost Decade(s)’. There-
after the proportion of the population depend-
ent on working people has steadily risen and 
is expected to reach about one worker per 
dependent in 2055. China will reach its most 
advantageous ratio in around 2015 and South 
Korea in 2025. 
 
The Changing Spatial Distribution of Ja-
pan’s Population 
Alongside ageing has occurred a dramatic 
shift in the population’s spatial distribution due 
to the familiar processes of agricultural trans-
formation, industrialization, and urbanization 
that accompany modern economic growth 
(Figures 2 and 3). Whereas 41 per cent of the 
population lived in urban areas in 1960, by 
2010 this had increased to 67 per cent, with 
an increase in the total population over the 
same period of 73 per cent. This has placed 
enormous pressures on urban areas in ac-
commodating ever rising demand for housing, 
infrastructure, and services. Less noticeable 
has been the stresses that population loss 
have placed on rural regions. 
 
Figure 2: Population change in Japan by pre-
fecture and prefectural capital 1990-2010 
(Solid areas indicate growth, patterned 
shrinkage) (Source: National census data). 
 
 
 
In general, internal migration in Japan 
can be understood as a movement by pre-
dominantly younger adults from rural to urban 
locations in search of more plentiful, varied, 
and higher quality education, employment, 
and social opportunities, and producing urban-
ization at four levels of geographical scale or 
distance: 
 
• inter-regional (to metropolitan centres; 
Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya), 
• inter-prefectural (to regional centres; eg. 
Fukuoka, Sapporo and Sendai), 
• inter-municipal (to prefectural capitals and 
core cities), 
• and intra-municipal (to the municipal ur-
ban zone). 
 
Within this spatial redistribution of 
population can be discerned some general-
izable patterns, with similar patterns having 
been experienced in South Korea and China 
thus far. 
 
Figure 3: Projected population change in Ja-
pan by prefecture and prefectural capital 
2010-2030. (Source: National Inst. Of Pop. 
and Social Security Research). 
 
 
 
First, rural locales are now widely rec-
ognized as being hyper-aged societies lacking 
the means to sustainably reproduce their own 
populations such that communities are declin-
ing in vitality and, in increasing numbers, even 
collapsing and disappearing altogether. Se-
cond, while urbanization was taking place 
against the backdrop of an expanding national 
population, metropolitan centres and prefec-
tural capitals in particular expanded very rap-
idly, to some extent at the expense of rural 
shrinkage, such that there is now excessive 
over-crowding in some urban districts. How-
ever, and third, with depopulation now taking 
place at the national level nearly all settle-
ments are now shrinking. Consequently, de-
population can no longer be considered an 
unfortunate rural expression of successful na-
tional economic development, as it once was, 
but also as an urban phenomenon and a con-
dition affecting settlements of all sizes and 
concentrations. Accordingly, and fourth, de-
population is experienced spatially as a retreat 
from the peripheries of the archipelago, with 
the most remote hamlets collapsing first, and 
progressively larger settlements being drawn 
into a recursive spiral of ageing, depopulation 
and decline, until almost the entire land area 
of the country experiences the impacts in 
some form or another. 
 
Impacts of Ageing and Depopulation in Ru-
ral Japan 
Ageing and depopulation are being felt in all 
areas of Japan’s social, economic, political 
and cultural life. In this section I will focus on 
some of the more significant issues that rural 
communities have faced and which, with 
some reservations, as processes of ageing 
and depopulation become more widespread 
and severe in the near future, may also occur 
in urban settlements in the rest of Japan, as 
well as in other East and Southeast Asian 
countries. 
 In Japan a large number of rural com-
munities are in decline and some are collaps-
ing. This is what Japanese social scientists 
mean when they describe ‘genkai shuuraku’, 
or ‘communities on the edge’. In these there is 
virtually no economic activity between resi-
dents, few children are being born, an increas-
ing proportion of the built environment is emp-
ty, idle and deteriorating, agricultural land is 
being abandoned, and forests are encroach-
ing on human settlements. Such communities 
have little attraction for reinvestment or in-
migrants and, in the course of time, some will 
disappear entirely. What are some of the con-
ditions of living in such communities? 
 
Figure 4: An abandoned elementary school in 
Niigata Prefecture, northwestern Japan. (Pho-
to: Peter Matanle) 
 
 
 Beginning with employment, which is 
the foundation for any stable local economy, 
well-paid secure jobs that do not require phys-
ical labour is in short supply in rural Japan. 
Traditional routes into employment for eldest 
sons and daughters wishing to remain living in 
the family holding and care for ageing parents, 
such as family commercial enterprises, munic-
ipal administration and school teaching, are 
fast disappearing as economic functions in 
rural communities decline, and where public 
and private services are in retreat. For exam-
ple, over-capacity in educational infrastructure 
due to fewer school age children means that 
schools are merging or closing down, leading 
to fewer teaching opportunities; and increas-
ing numbers of empty school buildings dot the 
landscape, reminding residents of once thriv-
ing communities (Figure 4). 
Similarly, rationalization of local au-
thorities has led to a wave of municipal mer-
gers. Few job openings are appearing in pub-
lic administration or essential services as or-
ganizations remove duplication and slim work-
forces through retiree attrition. Moreover, the 
preference among urban Japanese for holi-
days overseas means that seasonal tourism 
related work is thin on the ground in previous-
ly popular domestic rural destinations, leading 
to the closure of hotels, facilities and shops 
(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: An abandoned rural hotel in Niigata 
Prefecture, Northwestern Japan. (Photo: Peter 
Matanle) 
 
 
 Municipal mergers have encouraged 
local centralization of administration, which in 
turn has generated the closure of public facili-
ties in outlying areas. This has produced vari-
ous consequences. First, services have be-
come more distant from users; yet, reductions 
in subsidies combined with reduced demand 
means that public transport is also being cut 
back. Residents feel forced into cars, which 
disproportionately affects older people living 
alone, who require more frequent and easier 
access to services, but who may not be able 
to drive. Second, office and facility closures 
resuch as shops and restaurants – in sur-
rounding neighbourhoods, reducing a com-
munity’s economic vitality. Third, younger and 
middle-aged people remaining in rural com-
munities are spending increasing resources 
and time helping and caring for elderly rela-
tives and neighbours in compensation for re-
duced formal service provision. Although such 
kindness is admirable, it reduces the oppor-
tunity that able citizens have for economically 
productive activity. 
 Figure 6: Abandoned and overgrown farm-
house and farm in Kochi Prefecture, South-
western Japan. (Photo: Peter Matanle) 
 
 
 Nevertheless, overcapacity is a serious 
issue in non-metropolitan regions, as commu-
nities empty out. Provincial real estate mar-
kets are failing as houses remain empty, and 
occupancy rates in apartment blocks reach 
alarmingly low levels. Property reinvestment is 
disappearing and the built environment look-
ing shabby and derelict, further depressing the 
atmosphere and prices, and causing remain-
ing residents to leave, if they can. Empty 
houses, or akiya, are becoming uninhabitable 
and unsellable due to colonization by fauna 
and flora (Figure 6). Ransacking and 
defacation by monkeys is a familiar blight. Alt-
hough land prices in central Tokyo are rising 
again, this belies a collapse in market condi-
tions in many rural areas. 
 
Figure 7: Index of Total Energy Consumption 
and Carbon Output by Shrinking and Growing 
Prefectures in Japan, measured against GDP 
Growth, 1990-2008. Sources: Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, and World 
Bank. 
 
 
Overcapacity in buildings and infra-
structure increases per unit running costs, as 
buildings still require heating, maintenance 
and security, for example. Local tax revenues 
decline and contribute to further service con-
solidation. Moreover, evidence shows that, 
despite the expectation that depopulation 
would reduce resource consumption, for ex-
ample, per capita energy use in depopulating 
prefectures is increasing more rapidly than in 
growing prefectures (Figure 7) due in part to 
processes outlined above. Deteriorating and 
underused buildings are inefficiently heated in 
winter, or residents are forced into cars and 
drive longer distances. Similarly, local ser-
vices such as post, community nursing, food 
and heating oil deliveries, and emergency 
services travel longer distances per client. 
Such a phenomenon, if generalized out 
across China and the rest of Asia, may have 
important consequences for world energy de-
mand and carbon output forecasts. 
 
Conclusion: The Future for East Asia 
While the future is always uncertain, China 
and South Korea will probably experience 
many of the outcomes of ageing and depopu-
lation currently being faced by Japan, due to 
their similar patterns of demographic and eco-
nomic change. Later in the century other 
countries in East and Southeast Asia, such as 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia may follow. 
 East Asia will remain an economically 
dynamic world region. However, a deep 
cleavage is appearing there, between the 
large, vibrant, energetic and young metropoli-
tan centres, such as Tokyo, Shanghai, Seoul, 
and Bangkok, and an increasingly old, shrink-
ing, depressed and struggling regional periph-
ery. Metropolitan centres are pulling away 
from the regional hinterland on which their 
continuing dynamism ultimately depends. How 
this tension between urban dynamism and 
rural decay will play out is uncertain. Never-
theless, the potential for disruption is present 
and, I argue, increasing. For example, even 
as urban demand for food expands, rural agri-
cultural production decrease, leading to higher 
prices. 
 Not only is the number and size of 
marginal regional communities increasing, 
their exposure to risks is also expanding. 
Whereas in previous decades in Japan only 
the most peripheral hamlets were under 
threat, in the 21st century even provincial core 
cities are losing their vitality. With more than 
90 per cent of Japan’s municipalities now 
shrinking it is certain that the impacts of age-
ing and depopulation will spread to large re-
gional and metropolitan settlements. For ex-
ample, health and welfare costs are rising and 
the central government wishes to pass some 
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costs on to local authorities, with the result 
that the most vulnerable municipalities will 
bear a disproportionate economic burden. 
Importantly, the March 11, 2001 tsu-
nami in Northeastern Japan has shown how 
vulnerable ageing marginal communities are 
to extreme environmental disturbances. Cli-
mate change theory predicts extreme weather 
events of increasing frequency and intensity, 
and the Northwestern zone of the Pacific Ring 
of Fire appears to be experiencing an in-
crease in seismic intensity. As East Asia de-
velops, it is possible that extreme disturb-
ances will also destabilize industrial facilities 
such as power stations and chemical plants, 
such as occurred at Fukushima in Japan. 
 It is my belief that a careful study of 
how economic and demographic change in-
teract in present-day Japan will provide es-
sential knowledge for responding to similar 
circumstances in the rest of East and South-
east Asia. In particular, how Japan responds 
to the intersection between the long-run en-
dogenous ‘disaster’ of rural decline and the 
sudden exogenous ‘disaster’ of the 2011 
Tohoku tsunami and nuclear crisis will be es-
pecially instructive for other regions in Asia as 
they traverse their paths through industrial 
and post-industrial development in the coming 
decades. 
 
Summary 
• Japan is in the midst of a dramatic 
century-long shift in the size, age 
structure and spatial distribution of its 
population. 
• The impacts of ageing and depopula-
tion are being felt in all areas of social, 
economic, cultural and political life. 
• While community decline was confined 
to the most peripheral villages, even 
regional cities are now losing some of 
their vitality. 
• Due to similar patterns of economic 
development and demographic 
change, what is currently occurring in 
Japan will likely occur in future in other 
countries in East and Southeast Asia. 
• Although East and Southeast Asia will 
remain economically dynamic, a deep 
cleavage is appearing between still vi-
brant metropolitan centres and a 
struggling rural hinterland. 
• Issues to watch: regional socio-
economic sustainability, rural-urban bi-
furcation and disruption, health and 
welfare provision, resource consump-
tion patterns, agricultural self-
sufficiency ratios, potential impacts of 
extreme environmental disturbances. 
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